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BEYOND AUTONOMY: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
AND THE LEGAL LIMITS NECESSARY
TO UPHOLD THE HIPPOCRATIC
TRADITION AND
PRESERVE THE ETHICAL INTEGRITY OF THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION*
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by anal-
ogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial
necessity of order in the social life." Wide enough in all conscience
is the field of discretion that remains.'
There are limits to what medicine can achieve. However, this is a reality
that some people, when faced with a relative's death, refuse to accept. Even
when experienced physicians diagnose an unconscious and severely brain-
damaged patient's condition as medically irreversible and beyond any benefi-
cial treatment, patients' families hold out hope for miracles.2 This is under-
standable. The controversy arises, however, when relatives demand that
doctors continue to do everything possible to sustain the patient's life, re-
gardless of the financial cost, the medical benefit, or the ethics of further
* This Comment is dedicated to the loving and gentle memory of my father, James A.
Murphy, who was born to eternal life on August 17, 1992. Without his quiet strength, steady
but patient encouragement, deep faith, and constant love, I could not have undertaken the
challenges I have met in this life. By profession, he was a teacher of mathematics; by example,
a teacher of sacrifice, strength, faith, devotion, and love. All I have achieved, and all I will
accomplish, is his. Dad, you were the sunshine on the land. And now that you are safely
home and at rest in the arms of Christ, you have made "the face of heaven ... so fine that all
the world [is] in love with night and pay[s] no worship to the garish sun." (WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET act 3, sc. 2.).
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1949) (citation
omitted), quoted in In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010,
1017 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring in dissent), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
2. Members of both the Wanglie and "Doe" families, the families in the two illustrative
cases hereinafter discussed, conceded that their insistence on continued aggressive treatment
was based at least in part on their holding out hope for miracles. See infra notes 30, 51, 52 and
accompanying text.
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treatment.3
Demands that a physician provide treatment that he believes to be medi-
cally contraindicated put the physician in a difficult ethical, legal, and pro-
fessional position. Employing the courts to force physicians to do so gravely
threatens the foundations on which the practice of medicine is founded. To
compel a doctor to act contrary to medical judgment undermines the physi-
cian's duty to profession and patient alike. It also may violate the physi-
cian's personal conscience and sense of morality. As one scholar has
described this problem:
Any doctor who ... is compelled by law to make any decision he
would not otherwise have made, is being forced to act against his
own mind, which means forced to act against his own life. He is
also being forced to violate his most fundamental professional com-
mitment, that of using his own best judgment at all times for the
greatest benefit of his patient.4
Nevertheless, because of the ascendant statutory recognition5 and judicial
enforcement 6 of patients' claims to autonomy in medical decision-making,7
3. "Obviously there is little controversy when the patient's request coincides with the
strategy favored by the physician. On the other hand, a problem arises when a patient's re-
quest conflicts with the physician's conception of acceptable practice." Allan S. Brett & Lau-
rence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific Interventions: Defining the Limits of the
Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1347 (1986). See Lawrence J. Nelson &
Robert M. Nelson, Ethics and the Provision of Futile, Harmful, or Burdensome Treatment to
Children, 20 CRITICAL CARE MED. 427, 427 (1992) (discussing the similar situation in which
parents insist on vigorous treatment for their children when the physician has concluded that
continued treatment is medically and ethically wrong).
4. Robert M. Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1288,
1290-91 (1971).
5. At present, approximately forty-seven state legislatures have authorized living wills,
which enable individuals to prepare advance directives for the provision of life-sustaining med-
ical treatment to them, should they become incompetent. Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Au-
tonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One's Postcompetence Medical Fate, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 13 n.1 (1992). At the federal level, the recently enacted Patient Self-Determina-
tion Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (Supp. 111990) requires that federally funded hospitals
and health care organizations provide patients with written information regarding their rights
to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and their rights under state law to execute
advance directives. For a general discussion of the Patient Self-Determination Act, see
Michael A. Refolo, Commentary, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990. Health Care's
Own Miranda, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455 (1992), and Kelly C. Mulholland,
Protecting the Right to Die: The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
609 (1991). See also Deborah Mesce, New Law Requires Medical Facilities to Help Patients
Prepare for Death, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1991, at A4 (describing the manner in which the
Patient Self-Determination Act will assist patients to make their own decisions regarding their
post-competence medical treatment).
6. "The law protects [a person's] right to make [his] own decision to accept or reject
treatment." Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986)
(quoting Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) ); see also Cruzan v.
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doctors commonly fear the legal ramifications of terminating, or refusing to
provide, the treatment demanded.' The unfortunate result has been "the
fear of litigation that now paralyzes health care providers and administra-
tors,"9 which, in turn, results in the provision of costly but futile care in
hospitals across the country. Situations such as this, in which the physician
objects to continuing the life-sustaining medical treatment that the patient or
her family demands, have surfaced only recently in the bioethical litera-
ture. ' Presently, American courts are beginning to adjudicate these "physi-
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (recognizing that the competent
patient has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment).
7. "In the last 25 years autonomy has superseded beneficence as the first principle of
medical ethics. This is the most radical reorientation in the long history of the Hippocratic
tradition." Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Relationship of Autonomy and Integrity in Medical
Ethics, 24 BULL. PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. 361, 361 (1990).
8. These fears are not without historical, legal substantiation. See John J. Paris et al.,
Ethical Context for Physician Refusal of Requested Treatment, 11 J. PERINATOLOGY 273, 274
(1991) ("[T]he Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ... to this day frighten[s] many
physicians into believing that the law requires them to do everything possible to save every
seriously ill newborn."). Popularized accounts of criminal prosecution of physicians may also
instill this fear in physicians when they consider withdrawing nutritional fluids or other means
of life support. See, e.g., Judith Cummings, Doctors Accused of Starving Comatose Patient,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1983, at A10 (reporting that two doctors faced murder charges for with-
drawing a patient's life support); Judith Cummings, 2 California Prosecutors Challenging a
Decision on Artificial Life Support, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1983, at B18 (reporting that the
court barred the district attorney's office from prosecuting the two doctors on murder
charges). Contra COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS & COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE AND THE DECISION TO
WITHDRAW OR WITHHOLD LIFE SUPPORT 1 (1989), reprinted in 263 JAMA 426 (1990).
"The suggestion that ending treatment in this circumstance is a form of criminal homicide has
been firmly rejected." Id.
9. Donald J. Murphy, M.D., Letter to the Editor (The Case of Baby L), 323 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1148 (1990). See also Jay P. Goldsmith, Point-Counterpoint: Physician's Refusal of
Requested Treatment (Views from the Journal's Editorial Board), 10 J. PERINATOLOGY 407,
414 (1990):
An enthusiastic 'Hear! Hear!' to the physicians who refused treatment of Baby L. It
is about time neonatologists stopped being manipulated by fear of litigation, govern-
ment regulations, and other outside pressures and stood up for our own principles.
How often have we continued in a futile attempt at life prolongation without hope of
survival or of any reasonable quality of life potential only because of nonmedical
intrusions into our province?
Id. See Nelson & Nelson, supra note 3, at 427 (discussing the analogous scenario in which
parents insist on continued aggressive treatment for their children when the physician objects
to the treatment as medically or ethically wrong).
10. The case of Baby L, reported in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1990, see
infra note 11, was the first of such cases to be reported. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 1148
(noting that the case of Baby L "appears to be the first time a health care team ... was willing
to defend in court their decision to deny a request for life-sustaining therapy that they thought
was futile").
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cian-refusal" cases with precious little precedent. Although the cases of
Baby L " and Baby E. T. 2 were rendered moot before courts could reach
decisions on their merits, 3 trial courts in Minnesota and Georgia did con-
front this issue in two well-publicized 1991 cases: In Re Wanglie 4 and In re
Doe ("Scottish Rite").15
As the Wanglie, Scottish Rite, Baby L, and Baby E. T cases demonstrate,
American courts are just beginning to encounter what have been termed
"physician-refusal" 16 cases. Given the depth and breadth of the roots of the
physician-refusal dilemma, the issue is not likely to disappear. Faced with
11. John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990).
12. Paris, supra note 8, at 273.
13. Before the probate court in Massachusetts could make a final decision, Baby L was
transferred to the care of a pediatric neurologist (from another institution) who was willing to
accommodate the family's demand for aggressive treatment. With this transfer, the legal dis-
pute ended. Paris, supra note 11, at 1013. Similarly, in the case of Baby E.T., the infant died
while the case was pending in the Chicago Juvenile Court. Paris, supra note 8, at 273.
14. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991). For
one reporter's discussion of the case, see Mark Hansen, Doctors Assert Patient's Right to Die,
A.B.A.J., Oct. 1991, at 26, 26-27.
15. In re Doe, No. D-93064 (Fulton County, Ga., Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991), aff'd, 418
S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992). Because the events in this case occurred at the Scottish Rite Hospital for
Crippled Children in Atlanta, the trial court's decision is also referred to in this Comment as
"Scottish Rite." For contemporaneous media accounts of the trial court's decision, see B.D.
Colen, Judge Bars Letting Girl in Coma Die, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 1991, at 4; Judge Rules
Parents May Keep Comatose Child Alive, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 18, 1991, at C4; Life Supports
Upheld, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A12.
While this Comment focuses on the proper course of action for American courts in a physi-
cian-refusal case, a recent decision by the English Court of Appeal is instructive in this regard.
In June 1992, The British Medical Journal reported the case of Baby J, [1990] 3 All E.R. 932
(C.A.). Baby J, a "case on the frontiers of law and medicine," was the "first case to raise the
issue of whether courts can order doctors to carry out treatment against their clinical judg-
ment." Clare Dyer, Appeal Court Supports Doctors' Decision Not to Treat, 304 BRIT. MED. J.
1527, 1527-28 (1992). As in the United States, the English Court of Appeal had addressed
related cases in the past, "but there was no question in earlier cases of ordering doctors to
carry out treatment they considered to be inappropriate." Id. at 1528. In Baby J, the Court of
Appeal "overturned an earlier High Court ruling that had required a London hospital to pro-
vide life support for a severely brain damaged eighteen-month-old child whose doctors were
unanimous in believing that such treatment was not appropriate." Ross Kessel, British Judges
Cannot Order Doctors to Treat, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1992, at 3, 3. Lord Donald-
son, of the Court of Appeal, declared that "the court's exercise of its power to protect the
interests of minors 'should not require a medical practitioner. . to adopt a course of treatment
which in the bona fide clinical judgment of the practitioner was contraindicated.' " Id. at 3-4
(internal citation omitted). The physician's duty, he continued, "subject to obtaining any nec-
essary consent, was to treat the patient in accordance with his own best clinical judgement
[sic]." Id. at 4 (citation omitted). Lord Justice Balcombe, in concurrence, said that he "could
conceive of no situation where it would be [proper] to order a doctor to treat a child in a
manner contrary to his or her clinical judgement [sic]." Id. (citation omitted).
16. See Paris, supra note 8, at 1012; Paris, supra note 11, at 273.
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the legal elevation of patients' claims to autonomous decision-making,' 7
American courts now must determine just how far autonomy goes. Does it
encompass an affirmative right of the patient to demand or design medical
treatment? Is it limited to the refusal of unwanted or nonconsensual treat-
ment? How does the concept of autonomy relate to the physician's moral
agency and judgment in light of the ethical obligations imposed on her by
the medical profession and its Hippocratic tradition?'"
This Comment examines the legal, medical, and ethical issues involved in
such a case. Part I presents the Wanglie and Scottish Rite decisions as illus-
trative both of the problem and the inadequate judicial response thereto.
This part then explores the scope and the roots of the physician-refusal di-
lemma. In Part II, this Comment discusses the opposing positions, the con-
flict of which animates the bioethical debate over physician-refusal. Part III
traces the current ethical standards of the medical profession to their roots
in the Hippocratic tradition; it then illustrates the manner in which the ar-
ticulated policies of the medical profession demonstrate contemporary ad-
herence to these ancient principles. In Part IV, this Comment examines the
present state of the decisional law at issue, with special emphasis on (A) the
judicial development and protection of the state's interest in preserving the
ethical integrity of the medical profession; and (B) the nature and extent of
the legal rights of patients to control the medical care provided to them.
Part V analyzes the implications of absolutizing patients' right to control
medical treatment and illustrates the mischief and imperilment that such a
policy would bring to the historic mission of the medical profession. In Part
VI, this Comment concludes that when presented with a physician-refusal
case, a court should employ judicial restraint by refusing to yield to what
Justice Cardozo labeled "spasmodic sentiment... or ... unregulated benev-
olence."' 9 The court should draw its inspiration from the "consecrated" 2°
and established principles of ethical medical practice rooted in the Hippo-
cratic tradition and clearly articulated in the extant standards of the medical
profession.
17. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III (discussing obligations developed and imposed by the Hippocratic
Tradition). See also The Hippocratic Oath, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICs 54 (Thomas A. Mappes &
Jane S. Zembaty, eds., 2d ed. 1986).
19. CARDOZO, supra note 1.
20. Id.
1993]
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I. THE PHYSICIAN-REFUSAL DILEMMA: WAITING FOR THE MIRACLE
A. The Wanglie Case
The first judicial decision in a physician-refusal case is that of Helga M.
Wanglie,21 an eighty-seven-year-old retired schoolteacher who lay in an irre-
versible persistent vegetative state ("PVS") 22 in the intensive care unit of a
Minneapolis hospital.23 After transfer from a nursing home to Hennepin
County Medical Center for emergency treatment in January 1990, she was
placed on a respirator.24 When attempts to wean her from the respirator
failed, she was released to a chronic care hospital; when a subsequent wean-
ing attempt also failed, she had to be resuscitated and was taken to another
hospital for intensive care.25 When she remained unconscious, her family
transferred her back to Hennepin County Medical Center in May 1990.26
There, her physicians concluded that she was in a persistent vegetative state
as a result of severe anoxic encephalopathy.27 She was kept on a respirator
and treated with repeated courses of antibiotics, frequent airway suctioning,
tube feedings, an air flotation bed, and biochemical monitoring.25 In June
and July of 1990, Mrs. Wanglie's doctors suggested that life-sustaining treat-
ment should be withdrawn because it was not benefiting her.29 However,
21. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28, 1991).
22. The distinguishing feature of PVS is chronic wakefulness without awareness.
Such unconscious wakefulness can be accompanied by spontaneous eye opening, the
utterance of unintelligible, instinctive sounds such as grunts or screams or even brief
smiles, as well as sporadic movements of facial muscles and nonparalyzed limbs.
Despite an "alert demeanor," observation and examination repeatedly fail to demon-
strate coherent speech, comprehension of the words of examiners or attendants, or
any capacity to initiate or make consistently purposeful movements.
JOINT REPORT OF COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS & COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE AND THE DECISION TO
WITHDRAW OR WITHHOLD LIFE SUPPORT 3 (1989), reprinted in 263 JAMA 426, 427 (1990).
23. Hansen, supra note 14, at 26.
24. Stephen H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325
NEWENG. J. MED. 512, 512-513 (1991).




29. Id. To the contrary, Dr. Robert M. Veatch concludes that in the Wanglie case, the
decision to stop mechanical ventilation of Mrs. Wanglie was not a medical one at all; it was
purely philosophical, ethical, and theological. Thus, Veatch argues that, in deciding that
mechanical ventilation should be stopped, Mrs. Wanglie's physicians were making a judgment
according to their own ethical and philosophical standards. In his view, they had no right to
impose that judgment on their patient. Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert M. Veatch, Di-
rector of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (Nov. 21,
1991). See Robert M. Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the
Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 36 (1992) (stating that this is "not a
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Mrs. Wanglie's husband, son, and daughter insisted on continued treatment,
at least in part because they felt "a miracle could occur."
31
In October 1990, a new attending physician concluded that Mrs. Wanglie
"was at the end of her life and that the respirator was 'non-beneficial,' in that
it could not heal her lungs, palliate her suffering, or enable this unconscious
and permanently respirator-dependent woman to experience the benefit of
the life afforded by respirator support."'a  Shortly thereafter, this doctor told
the Wanglie family that he was no longer willing to prescribe the respira-
tor.32 Mrs. Wanglie's husband, Oliver, refused to consent to terminating
treatment.33 He also refused to have his wife transferred to another facility
whose medical staff might agree to continue aggressive treatment.34 The
Medical Center sought the appointment of an independent conservator to
make this decision for Mrs. Wanglie.3  Finding no reason to remove Mr.
Wanglie as his wife's conservator, the trial court ruled that he should con-
tinue in that role. 36 Helga Wanglie died three days after that decision. 7 It
is particularly noteworthy that shortly thereafter, the Wanglies' lawyer
stated that "the family never doubted the doctors' prognosis; they just con-
tinued to hold out hope for a miracle.",
3 1
B. The In re Doe ("Scottish Rite") Case:
A second case involved a thirteen-year-old girl, who was a patient at Scot-
tish Rite Hospital for Crippled Children in Atlanta.39 She suffered from a
neurological degenerative disorder, with substantial brain damage and "no
judgment based on medical science. It is grounded in beliefs and values about which people
inevitably disagree. In such situations, clinicians' judgments cannot be decisive.")
30. Miles, supra note 24, at 513. See Hansen, supra note 14, at 26.
31. Miles, supra note 24, at 513.
32. Id. See Joseph S. Alpert, Persistent Vegetative State: Where Do We Go From Here?,
151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 855 (1991). "Prolonged survival of patients with PVS has
created a very difficult moral and ethical dilemma for the health care profession. Should these
patients receive intense, life-prolonging therapy?... Can we as a society afford to pay the high
costs for maintaining patients with PVS?" Id. Particularly vexing is the fact that PVS, a
"new" disease of the late twentieth century, is the result of the application of modem medical
technology. Id. "Patients with this devastating neurological entity rarely, if ever, survived for
long. Before the advent of modem medical interventions, such as intravenous antibiotics and
intravenous and/or enteral nutritional support." Id.
33. Miles, supra note 24, at 513.
34. Id.
35. Hansen, supra note 14, at 26.
36. In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283, slip op. at 6 (Hennepin County, Minn., P. Ct. June 28,
1991).
37. Hansen, supra note 14, at 26.
38. Id.
39. In re Doe, No. D-93064, slip op. at 2 (Fulton County, Ga., Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1991),
aff'd, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
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reasonable possibility of a 'meaningful recovery,' due to the fact that sub-
stantial portions of her brain [were] irreversibly damaged, including the ar-
eas which [controlled] her cognitive functions, her ability to eat, swallow and
breathe."'  Her doctor testified that she had "no self-awareness, self con-
trol, capacity to relate to others, or capacity to communicate or control her
existence."
41
Accordingly, the physicians and the Bioethics Committee at Scottish Rite
were of the opinion that all extraordinary life-sustaining medical procedures
should be discontinued.42 Because both parents did not consent to discontin-
uance, Scottish Rite sought declaratory relief and an order directing it to
deescalate all artificial and extraordinary medical measures that its physi-
cians were providing to the child.43 Dr. Edward M. Goldstein, the pediatric
neurologist who treated "Jane Doe" since her admission to Scottish Rite,
stated, "It's to the point the patient is being abused through medical technol-
ogy." ' The attending physicians, including the doctor who had treated the
child for the preceding six years, believed the girl was in pain and told the
Judge it would be in the best interest of the patient to disconnect her respira-
tor.45 At trial, Dr. Goldstein testified that he found it "ethically and morally
unconscionable" to continue treatment.46
Notwithstanding the physicians' testimony, the trial court ruled in favor
of the family and enjoined the hospital from deescalating treatment without
the consent of both parents.47 It did so despite its awareness that the linger-
ing death of the patient was "having a disastrous effect on the Hospital per-
sonnel, and [was] demoralizing to the nursing and house staff."'48 While the
court claimed to "empathize[] with their extraordinary burden," it con-
cluded that "such factors cannot be considered by the Court in this case." 49
Undermining the court's professed concern for the medical staff is its analyt-
ical view of the case, which identified only three competing interests: "the
fundamental rights of each of the parents; the responsibilities of the state;
and the best interests of the child."5° Herein lies the basic conceptual failure
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 7, 9.
44. Judge Rules Parents May Keep Comatose Child Alive, CHICAGO TRIB., Oct. 18, 1991,
at C4.
45. Id.
46. B.D. Colen, supra note 15, at 4 (emphasis added).
47. In re Doe, slip op. at 23-24.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 9.
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of the trial court's decision: it gave no legal weight to the rights or concerns
of the doctors, nurses, or staff at Scottish Rite-an interest which the courts
must, and regularly do, address in order to preserve the ethical integrity of
the medical profession.
As in Wanglie, "Jane Doe's" family seemed unable to accept the fact that
there was no medical treatment that could improve the child's condition.
On the day following the trial court's decision, The Washington Post re-
ported that "[t]he father of the girl holds out hope for a miracle, but doctors
say she will never recover."51 Newsday reported that the child's father re-
fused to permit physicians to withdraw treatment because "he believes in
miracles.",52 "I don't believe there's such a thing as no hope," he said.
53
The miracle never came; "Jane Doe" died within a few weeks after the trial
court's decision.
54
C. The Scope and Roots of the Dilemma:
The demands of the Wanglie family and "Jane Doe's" family are not
unique. Indeed, "considerable numbers of patients with terminal illnesses or
hopeless prognoses maintain a desire for intensive life-supportive care." 55
One study demonstrates that the majority of patients and families "uncondi-
tionally desire[s] intensive care even toward the end of life."56 The results of
this study indicate that elderly patients with previous intensive care unit hos-
pitalizations are "generally extremely willing to undergo intensive care re-
gardless of their age, functional status, perceived quality of life, hypothetical
life expectancy, or the nature of their previous intensive care unit experi-
ence." 57 Likewise, family members generally expressed a "similar eagerness
to have their relatives undergo intensive care.",
58
The Wanglie and Scottish Rite cases illustrate the manner in which these
wishes can conflict with the ethical standards and professional obligations of
physicians. The roots of this conflict can be traced to three distinct yet coa-
lescent sources. The first, and most obvious, is the emergence in the last four
decades of new medical technology, which has given us the power to fore-
51. Life Supports Upheld, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A12.
52. Colen, supra note 15, at 4.
53. Id.
54. In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 5 n.2 (Ga. 1992).
55. Roger C. Bone & Ellen H. Elpern, Monitoring Patient Preferences and Rationing In-
tensive Care, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1061, 1061 (1991).
56. Marion Danis et al., Patients' and Families' Preferences for Medical Intensive Care,
260 JAMA 797, 802 (1988).
57. Id. at 801.
58. Id.
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stall death and thus prolong indefinitely the lives of critically ill patients.59
Such technology has transformed both the causes of death and the process of
dying."' Where patients would have died from the natural course of a dis-
ease in the past, almost no disease can be said to have a "natural history"
today.6I As one court has noted, "Hopelessly or terminally ill patients who
in the past would have met with a swift end, now find, that medical science
can sustain them, near the threshold of death, but not yet across it."'62 An-
other court has concluded, "The procedures used can be accurately de-
scribed as a means of prolonging the dying process rather than a means of
continuing life."' 63 Thus, today's physicians regularly face the issues of how
long a life must be extended, and under what conditions is it humane and
ethically acceptable to do so.
Professor Nancy Jecker 6 has identified a -second source of the present
dilemma.65 It lies in the substitution of the Hippocratic medical tradition
with the "value-free" imperatives of Baconian science, which "infects medi-
cal decisionmaking" today. 66 While the Hippocratic physician sought to
support and lend assistance to human nature, and thus restore a natural
balance to a person's health, the Baconian tradition of the seventeenth cen-
tury advanced the idea of controlling, conquering, and mastering nature.67
The legacy of this tradition, which colonial physicians transported to
America, is the "presumption in favor of aggressive treatment" that today
characterizes demands for continued life support against extremely poor
odds.68
59. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BI-
OMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 15 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics Committees
and Decisions to Limit Care, 260 JAMA 803, 806 (1988).
60. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 59, at 16-18.
61. Louis Lasagna, The Prognosis of Death, in THE DYING PATIENT 67, 76 (Orville G.
Brim, Jr. et al., eds., 1970).
62. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Ill. 1989). Accord John F. Kennedy
Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984) (stating that "[i]t is now possible to hold
such persons on the threshold of death for an indeterminate period of time by utilizing ex-
traordinary mechanical or other artificial means to sustain their vital bodily functions").
63. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 923.
64. Nancy S. Jecker is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Medical History and
Ethics and an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University
of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
65. Nancy S. Jecker, Knowing When to Stop: The Limits of Medicine, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., May-June 1991, at 5, 7.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 6-7.
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Dr. Edmund Pellegrino" articulates athird source of the present dilemma
in his observation that "[i]n the last 25 years autonomy has superseded be-
neficence as the first principle of medical ethics."70 Dr. Pellegrino sees this
radical transformation in the Hippocratic tradition as "a response to the coa-
lescence of sociopolitical, legal, and ethical forces that make it well-nigh irre-
versible."'" In reaction to the paternalism of the medical profession, these
forces bring demands for self-determination and require the informed con-
sent of the patient in medical decisions.72 Adding legal weight to these
claims of autonomy, American courts since 1976 have grounded the right to
refuse treatment in a constitutional right of privacy and the common law
right to informed consent.7 3 Recently, however, the conceptual momentum
of autonomy has been so potent that there now exists what Dr. Pellegrino
calls a "tendency to absolutize autonomy.. 74 Separated from its theoretical
roots, autonomy is thus misconstrued and elevated as a right, not merely a
claim, of the patient. One danger in absolutizing autonomy is that doing so
misperceives autonomy as a primary objective in medical decisions rather
than as a vehicle for ensuring the patient's participation in them. In terms of
its impact on the effectiveness of the physician's clinical judgment, this ten-
dency is especially problematic because it shifts the locus of decisionmaking
69. Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., is Senior Research Scholar, Kennedy Institute of Eth-
ics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
70. Edmund D. Pellegrino, supra note 7, at 361.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 363.
73. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990). See, e. g.,
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that right to privacy encom-
passes right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment); Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Flem-
ing, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1987) (finding that individual's right to refuse medical
treatment is supported by the doctrine of informed consent and by the right to privacy under
the state constitution); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360-61 (Fla. 1980) (affirming pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment on grounds of his constitutional right of privacy); In re Estate
of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (11. 1989) (recognizing common law right of patient to
withhold consent and thus refuse treatment); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987)
(finding personal right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment to be firmly anchored in the
common law doctrine of informed consent); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497
N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986) (basing right to refuse on common law right and penumbral
constitutional right to privacy); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (basing decision on common law's recognition of right to be free
from nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J.
1985) (holding that right to decline medical treatment is "embraced within the common law
right to self-determination"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.) (holding right to
refuse medical treatment to be supported by right to privacy and right to be free from un-
wanted bodily invasion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
74. Pellegrino, supra note 7, at 361.
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from the physician to the patient.
75
The physician-refusal dilemma is the natural and inevitable product of the
convergence of these forces. Medical technology can forestall death. The
Baconian tradition calls physicians to control nature and conquer death.
Under the claim of autonomy, patients and their families prefer and demand
that physicians postpone death. The issue at stake, then, is the physician's
responsibility to oblige these demands. Is he legally, professionally, or ethi-
cally bound to obey these commands when the treatment requested is, in the
physician's judgment, medically or ethically wrong?
II. THE BIOETHICAL DEBATE
A. The Patient/Surrogate as the Sole Decision-Maker
Dr. Marcia Angell has articulated the argument on one side of the physi-
cian-refusal debate.76 She contends that, regardless of the physician's judg-
ment as to the usefulness of treatment, the proper decision-making authority
in the case of an incompetent patient can rest only in the patient's family.7 7
Dr. Angell concludes that when the court granted conservatorship of Helga
Wanglie to her husband (who demanded further aggressive treatment), it
correctly implied that the most important consideration was who made the
decision, not what the decision was.78 Her argument continues that "any
other decision by the court would have been inimical to patient autonomy
and would have undermined the consensus on the right to die that has been
carefully crafted since the Quinlan case."
79
By Dr. Angell's own admission, this position does not propose that pa-
tients have the right to demand any treatment they choose; rather, this right
is limited to (1) refusing treatment or (2) choosing among effective ones.8"
Applying this reasoning in the case of Mrs. Wanglie, the hospital was bound
to maintain her on the respirator because it was "effective" in achieving the
family's goal of keeping her alive.81 Although the hospital disagreed with
the effectiveness of continued life support, it was bound by the patient's right
75. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD:
THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 11 (1988).
76. Marcia Angell, The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of "Right to Die" Case, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 511 (1991).
77. Id. at 512.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 512.
81. Id. This, however, would be the exception that swallows the rule. As respirators are,
by nature, "effective" in keeping patients alive indefinitely, this approach would, in effect, give
the patient an unfettered and limitless right to demand continued aggressive treatment by any
means of intervention that could extend life.
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of self-determination to accept her decision and to provide the treatment
demanded. The only conceivable basis for a hospital or physician to inter-
fere with the patient's right of self-determination would occur when the deci-
sion violates the best interest of the patient.82 Otherwise, according to Dr.
Angell, "[i]nstitutions lie outside this.., decision-making and should inter-
vene by going to court only if they believe a decision violates these
standards.
83
Echoing similar sentiments, Professors Robert M. Veatch 4 and Carol M.
Spicer 5 assert that because a physician's clinical judgment about the effec-
tiveness or benefit of a given course of treatment incorporates the physician's
own beliefs and values, "clinicians' judgments cannot be decisive."8 6
Although they concede that autonomy does not give the patient or his surro-
gate decision-maker a right of access to care, Veatch and Spicer conclude
that because the medical profession is "a licensed professional monopoly...
an obligation to treat even against the conscience of the physician seems the
only course, until we can train professionals who will approve of such
interventions."
8 7
B. The Duty of Physicians to Provide Non-Beneficial Treatment
On the other side of the debate is the position that the doctor is not obli-
gated to provide treatment that is not beneficial to the patient. "The moral
basis of the physician-patient relationship is the obligation of the physician
to attempt to do the patient some good. Actions that do not contribute to
this end are not morally required."88 Recent policy statements by the Amer-
ican Medical Association, 9 the Society for Critical Care Medicine,9" and the
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Robert M. Veatch is Director and Professor of Medical Ethics, Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, and Professor, Philosophy Department and Medical Center, Georgetown University,
Washington, D.C.
85. Carol Mason Spicer is Managing Editor of Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal and
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
86. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 29, at 36.
87. Id. This statement begs the more fundamental question of whether we want physi-
cians that act against, or without considering, their consciences. The prospect of relieving
physicians of their responsibility as independent moral agents is a perilous one. See Gordon B.
Avery, Point-Counterpoint: Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment (Views from the Jour-
nal's Editorial Board), 10 J. PERINATOLOGY 407, 410 (1990) (noting that physicians must have
moral authority over their own actions if they are to be held responsible for those actions).
88. Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264 JAMA
1276, 1277 (1990). See generally Brett & McCullough, supra note 3, at 1347 (discussing
problems arising when a patient's request conflicts with the physician's conception of accepta-
ble practice).
89. See infra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
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American Thoracic Society 9l support this position.
Moreover, in the opinion of Dr. Pellegrino, deference to the argument that
one must focus on the decision-maker, rather than on the medical decision
itself is flawed for two reasons. 92 First, it ignores the criteria involved in
deciding what treatment is to be provided. 93 Second, it fails to propose a
resolution of the conflict between the patient and the physician.94
Admittedly, a decision not to provide a specific type of medical interven-
tion rests on two inherent value judgments. First, usefulness or futility can
be judged only in relation to the selection of a goal to be achieved. Because
the goals of a type of medical intervention are "open-ended," a decision that
a certain procedure does no good, or offers no benefit, implicitly makes a
value judgment as to which of those goals are acceptable or worth pursu-
ing.95 Second, an assertion that a treatment is not beneficial is a matter of
probability, not certainty.
96
That doctors' decisions involve value judgments and are not grounded in
absolute metaphysical certainty is an insufficient predicate upon which to
deny physicians the right to adhere to those decisions. Indeed, if we re-
quired physicians' medical judgments to be value-free, we would undermine
the fundamental role of the physician, and likely diminish the quality of
medical care provided. Because of the physician's Hippocratic duty to em-
ploy proactively his professional judgment to benefit and protect the sick,97
and thus to weigh the consequences of alternative treatments,9" physicians'
judgments cannot, and should not, be value-free. In essence, "to admit that
physicians should have the power to refrain from doing harm is to concede
that they have the moral authority to judge not just the harms, but also the
benefits, of medical interventions." 99
90. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
91. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
92. Interview with Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Senior Research Scholar, Kennedy In-




95. Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 88, at 1277.
96. Id.
97. The Hippocratic Oath contains the vow: "I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit
of the sick according to my .. .judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice." The
Hippocratic Oath, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 54, 54 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty,
eds., 2d ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
98. If physicians cannot employ their value judgments to restrict the wide range of alter-
natives made available to patients, patient autonomy can be undermined. Tomlinson & Brody,
supra note 88, at 1279.
99. Id. at 1278.
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III. THE PRINCIPLES AND TRADITIONS OF MEDICINE
As former Chief Justice Warren Burger once noted, "The law always lags
behind the most advanced thinking in every area. It must wait until the
theologians and the moral leaders and events have created some common
ground, some consensus."'" While consensus has been established regard-
ing the right of a patient to decline life-sustaining medical treatment, 10 1 there
is as yet no consensus on the right of the patient to compel the provision or
continuation of such treatment from a physician who objects to doing so.
This absence of consensus is largely because the major judicial opinions in
bioethical jurisprudence"0 2 have addressed only a small part of the larger
issue: namely, under what circumstances a patient can refuse to accept treat-
ment that, although life-sustaining, is unable to cure the underlying afflic-
tion.'0 3 These decisions did not face squarely the broader issue of the
physician's right to refuse to provide such treatment. In other words, the
courts allowed the patient to use ineffectiveness or lack of benefit as a predi-
cate to forego treatment, but they failed to address whether the doctor could
use the same argument as a basis for refusing to provide requested interven-
tions. " Although there seems no true consensus as to the responsibilities of
the physician in the physician-refusal case, there exists in the medical profes-
sion certain ethical standards of behavior-what Justice Cardozo may have
100. Warren E. Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.,
Sept. 1976, at 17. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
423 (Mass. 1977) (considering the framework of medical ethics in the legal context of a pa-
tient's rights).
101. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
102. These decisions are provided in note 103 infra. For a through discussion and schol-
arly analysis of these decisions, see George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a
Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination? 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 275, 384-408 (1988) (identifying these cases, with the exception of Cruzan, which had
yet to be decided, as constituting the leading case precedents).
103. In chronological order, these decisions are In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. 1978); In re Spring, 405
N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. 1980); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Bartling v. Superior Court,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp.,
Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
104. Tomlinson and Brody describe this problem as follows:
Until recently, the concept of "futility" always took a back seat to patient autonomy
in discussions of medical ethics. An awareness of the futility of treatment might be
used to support the rationality of a patient's autonomous treatment refusal, but it was
the autonomy and not the futility that carried all the moral weight.
Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 88, at 1276.
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considered the "consecrated principles"1 °5 to which the judiciary must look
before formulating official opinions.
A. The Tradition of Hippocrates
Historically, the obligations of the physician can be traced to the Hippo-
cratic tradition. In the treatise entitled The Art in the Hippocratic Corpus,
medicine is defined as having three roles: (1) "to do away with the sufferings
of the sick;" (2) "to lessen the violence of their diseases;" and (3) "to refuse
to treat those who are overmastered by their diseases, realizing that in such
cas~s medicine is powerless."'0 6 The Greek physician was "deeply conscious
of the religious and ethical imperative to respect the limits of his art....
Under the influence of his beliefs about nature, man and his own art, the
Greek physician understood that it was his duty to abstain from treating the
incurably and mortally ill .. .. 107 Clearly, the Hippocratic tradition not
only calls physicians to relieve bodily suffering, but it also places on them an
affirmative obligation to refuse to provide medical treatment when medicine
cannot cure the disease or improve the patient's condition.
This tradition follows two fundamental tenets. First, physicians must act
solely for the benefit of their patients. Second, physicians must "guard [their]
patients against the evil which they may suffer through themselves."' 0 8
These central duties are rooted in the thesis of the ancient Pythagoreans that
"men by nature are liable to inflict upon themselves injustice and mis-
chief."1°9 Moreover, as everything that is given to the body brings about a
"certain disposition of the soul ... the physician must tend to the soul as
well as to the body, and in so doing he must not forget the moral implica-
tions of medical actions." "0 The inherent duty of the physician, then, is not
only to make clinical judgments about a proposed course of treatment, but
also to evaluate the effect of that treatment upon the patient. If in that eval-
uation the physician concludes that the proposed treatment will either harm
the patient, or will not benefit that patient, he cannot provide it without
violating his professional duty.
105. CARDOZO, supra note 1.
106. Jecker, supra note 65, at 5 (emphasis added). See Darrel W. Amundsen, The Physi-
cian's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty Without Classical Roots, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Aug. 1978, at 23, 24 (same).
107. Amundsen, supra note 106, at 25 (quoting P. LAIN ENTRALGO, DOCTOR AND PA-
TIENT 48 (F. Partridge trans., 1969)) (emphasis added).





B. The President's Commission
In 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued its landmark re-
port Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment.111 This report begins
with the realization that "the drive to sustain life can conflict with another
fundamental (and arguably more venerable) objective of medicine-the relief
of suffering."'" 2 Noting the limited role of medicine in the Hippocratic tra-
dition, I 13 the report states that "[h]ealth care professionals serve patients
best by maintaining a presumption in favor of sustaining life, while recogniz-
ing that competent patients are entitled to choose to forego any treatments,
including those that sustain life."' 1 4 In its Summary of Conclusions, the
President's Commission justifies some constraints on patients' decisions:
"Health care professionals or institutions may decline to provide a particular
option because that choice would violate their conscience or professional
judgment, though in doing so they may not abandon a patient."' 15
The President's Commission takes a firm position in favor of preserving
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Specifically, it declares that
"[a]lthough competent patients.., have the legal and ethical authority to
forego some or all care, this does not mean that patients may insist on particu-
lar treatments. The care available from health care professionals is generally
limited to what is consistent with role-related professional standards and
conscientiously held personal beliefs."
' "16
C. The Medical Associations
The statements of the medical associations are in accord with the Presi-
dent's Commission. While generally accepting the right of the patient to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, the various membership associa-
tions of the medical profession support an ethically active and discerning
role for physicians in complying with patient requests. In 1982, the Ameri-
can Medical Association's Judicial Council stated that where the physician's
commitment to prolonging life and relieving suffering conflict with one an-
other, "the physician, patient, and/or family of the patient have the discre-
tion to resolve the conflict.""' 7
111. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 59.
112. Id. at 15.
113. Id. at 15 n.2.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
117. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF AM. MEDICAL ASS'N 9 (1982) (emphasis added).
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The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs reasserted this posi-
tion in a 1986 statement that reads: "[T]he physician should determine what
the possibility is for extending life under humane and comfortable condi-
tions .... In treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the
physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its
burdens."' 8 More recently, the AMA has defined the physician's obligation
to provide requested treatment in terms of only that which is "medically
indicated."" 9 In doing so, it has provided explicitly for a policy in which
patient-transfer is the first option. In a 1990 statement, the Council on Ethi-
cal and Judicial Affairs stated this policy as follows:
The physician has an obligation to cooperate in the coordination of
medically indicated care with other health care providers treating
the patient. The physician may not discontinue treatment of a pa-
tient as long as further treatment is medically indicated, without
giving the patient sufficient opportunity to make alternative ar-
rangements for care.' 2 °
In 1991, the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs established
guidelines for the appropriate use of do-not-resuscitate orders. 12 1 In no un-
certain terms, the Council declared that a physician "is not ethically obli-
gated to make a specific diagnostic or therapeutic procedure available to a
patient, even on specific request, if the use of such a procedure would be
futile."
122
118. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, WITHHOLDING
OR WITHDRAWING LIFE PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT 1 (Mar. 15, 1986).
119. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, Fundamental Elements of
the Patient-Physician Relationship, 264 JAMA 3133, 3133 (1990).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Medical Ass'n, Guidelines for the Appro-
priate Use of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868 (1991).
122. Id. at 1870. The Council considers resuscitative efforts to be "futile" if "they cannot
be expected to restore cardiac or respiratory function to the patient or to achieve the expressed
goals of the informed patient." Id. at 1871.
Despite the use of the term "futility" in the Council's statement, and in the statements by
the Society for Critical Care Medicine and the American Thoracic Society infra, a thorough
discussion of the various interpretations of medical futility is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment and is therefore not attempted herein. As numerous articles have demonstrated, the
concept of futility is fraught with numerous interpretations and has triggered an explosion of
scholarly debate. See, e.g., Leslie J. Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1281, 1281-85 (1987); Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The-Prob-
lem-Without-A-Name, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30, 31-35; J. Chris Hackler &
F. Charles Hiller, Family Consent to Orders Not to Resuscitate, 264 JAMA 1281, 1282-83
(1990); John D. Lantos et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81,
82 (1989); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implica-
tions, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949, 950-53 (1990); Mildred Solomon, "Futility" as a
Criterion in Limiting Treatment, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1239, 1239 (1992); Veatch & Spicer,
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The AMA's general position is supported by the Society for Critical Care
Medicine, whose December 1990 report stated:
A healthcare professional has no obligation to offer, begin, or
maintain a treatment which in his or her best judgment, will be
physiologically futile....
Treatments that offer no benefit and serve to prolong the dying
process should not be employed....
In light of a hopeless prognosis, the indefinite maintenance of pa-
tients reliably diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS) raises serious ethical concerns both for the dignity of thie
patient and for the diversion of limited medical and nursing re-,
sources from alternative applications that could offer medical and
nursing benefit to others.... The PVS patient should be removed
from the ICU unless it is not possible otherwise to meet the pa-
tient's nursing care needs.
123
The Society for Critical Care Medicine's report flatly declares that the
physician is under no obligation to provide therapy that is burdensome or
has no chance of achieving benefit. 124 While physicians should discuss their
objections and suggestions for alternative treatment with the patient, those
who object to providing requested treatment on grounds of conscience are
not obligated to comply with the request.'12  As a solution to this conflict,
transfer of the patient to another physician is suggested.
126
The following declaration by the American Thoracic Society demon-
strates its philosophical agreement with the Society for Critical Care
Medicine and the AMA:
[A] life-sustaining intervention may be withheld or withdrawn
from a patient without the consent of the patient or surrogate if the
intervention is judged to be futile. A life-sustaining intervention is
futile if reasoning and experience indicate that the intervention
supra note 29, at 16-21; Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094, 2094-95
(1988).
In response to the debate over use of the term "futility," which he considers a "buzzword,"
Robert D. Truog concludes that "[d]iscussions of futility add little to the analysis of difficult
cases." Robert D. Truog, Beyond Futility, J. CLINICAL ETHICS, Summer 1992, at 143, 145.
Truog adds that the concept of futility "hides and distorts the real issues," id., and concludes
that we must "move beyond futility, and recognize its limitations as a conceptual foundation in
bioethical decision making." Id.
123. Task Force on Ethics of Soc'y for Critical Care Medicine, 'Consensus Report on the
Ethics of Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatments in the Critically Ill, 18 CRITICAL CARE MED.
1435, 1436-37 (1990) [hereinafter Consensus Report].
124. Id. at 1436-37; Michael A. Rie, The Limits of a Wish, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-
Aug. 1991, at 25, 25.
125. Consensus Report, supra note 123, at 1436.
126. Id. at 1438.
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would be highly unlikely to result in meaningful survival for the
patient.
A physician has no ethical obligation to provide a life-sustaining
intervention that is judged futile . .. even if the intervention is
requested by the patient or surrogate decision maker. Forcing
physicians to provide medical interventions that are clearly futile
would undermine the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 1
2 7
To remain faithful to the Hippocratic tradition, physicians cannot admin-
ister treatments that would harm their patients, 128 and they must refuse to
provide treatments that cannot help patients "overmastered" by their dis-
eases.' 29 It would be an unprecedented reversal of this ancient tradition for
a modem court to order a physician to perform a medical intervention that,
in the physician's judgment, is non-beneficial, futile, harmful, or otherwise
violative of the physician's ethical obligations. The medical profession has
articulated ample standards that provide today's judiciary with strong gui-
dance as to the obligations to which physicians must adhere. 3 ' When con-
fronting a physician-refusal case, judges should, as Justice Cardozo exhorts,
draw their inspiration from the principles, methods, and standards so firmly
established in the profession and so deeply rooted in the philosophical tradi-
tion of Hippocrates. To do otherwise would chart an imprudent and hazard-
ous course for the courts, one that would substitute physician judgment with
untrained judicial conjecture.
IV. EXISTING JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
A. The State Interest in Preserving the Ethical Integrity of the Medical
Profession
The early Jehovah's Witness decisions were among the initial cases in
which American courts engaged the issues of medical ethics. 131 In these
cases, controversies arose when physicians sought to administer blood trans-
fusions to patients who were Jehovah's Witnesses. 132 Although these pa-
127. American Thoracic Soc'y, Position Paper: Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sus-
taining Therapy, 155 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 478, 481 (1991) (emphasis added).
128. See supra note 97 and infra note 201 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 106-27 and accompanying text.
131. For a thorough discussion of these cases, see John J. Paris, S.J., Compulsory Medical
Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1975).
132. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1001-02
(D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 752 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (N.J. 1971); Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 267
N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
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tients would likely die without the blood, they and their families refused on
religious grounds to authorize the transfusions. 133 The first court to address
the issue was the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in In
re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 134 In Georgetown Col-
lege, a twenty-five-year-old mother had been rushed to Georgetown Univer-
sity Hospital after she lost two-thirds of her blood supply from a ruptured
ulcer. 135 The patient and her husband, both Jehovah's Witnesses, refused a
transfusion. 136 Fearing civil liability, the hospital's doctors sought court de-
termination of their legal rights and responsibilities before providing or with-
holding the necessary transfusion. 137  Judge J. Skelly Wright granted
permission for the physicians to override the patient's refusal and administer
the transfusions.1
38
In the years to come, other courts confronted many such cases involving
Jehovah's Witnesses. 139 During this period, the analytical construct of the
countervailing state interests developed by Judge Wright in Georgetown Col-
lege became the foundational framework for bioethical jurisprudence. Judge
Wright identified three state interests at issue in these cases: (1) the state
interest in preventing suicide; (2) a parens patriae interest in protecting the
patient's minor children from abandonment by their parent; and (3) the pro-
tection of the medical profession's desire to act affirmatively to save life with-
out fear of civil liability.""14 Using the state interests in Georgetown College
as a starting point, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Superinten-
133. Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1002; George, 239 F. Supp. at 753; Heston, 279 A.2d
at 671; Powell, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 451. The basis of their objection is found in the biblical pro-
scriptions against "eating blood" found in Acts 15:28-29; Deuteronomy 12:23; Genesis 9:3-4;
and Leviticus 17:10-14. Paris, supra note 131, at 2 n.7.
134. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964). See Paris, supra note 131, at 5.
135. Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1006.
136. Id. at 1007.
137. Id. at 1002-03.
138. Id. at 1001-02.
139. See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 443 (Ill. 1965) (holding that the lower
court violated a Jehovah's Witness's basic constitutional rights by appointing an independent
conservator to authorize the patient's transfusion); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Hes-
ton, 279 A.2d 670, 675 (N.J. 1971) (unanimously affirming trial court's appointment of guard-
ian to consent to surgery and transfusion of Jehovah's Witness, finding "that the interest of the
hospital and its staff, as well as the State's interest in [preserving] life, warranted the transfu-
sion of blood under the circumstances"). See also United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752,
753-54 (D. Conn. 1965) (ordering transfusion for adult patient despite religious beliefs); Powell
v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)
(same); cf. Collins v. Davis, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (ordering surgery
when patient could not consent, and patient's wife refused to give consent, although apparently
not for religious reasons).
140. Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1008-09.
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dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz' 4' surveyed the decisions in-
volving the right of an individual to refuse medical intervention and distilled
from them a modified set of four state interests: "(1) the preservation of life;
(2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention
of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession."142
The seminal case on the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment is the
New Jersey Supreme Court's 1976 landmark opinion in In re Quinlan."43 In
this case, Mr. Quinlan sought to have a respirator disconnected from his
twenty-two-year-old daughter, Karen Ann, whom the court described as
"profoundly damaged" and "probably irreversibly doomed to no more than
a biologically vegetative remnant of life." 1" Because the medical treatment
could not restore Karen to a conscious, functioning existence, the Quinlan
court reasoned that the state's interest in preserving life weakened "as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."' 45 Reasoning
from a right of privacy standpoint, the court determined that Karen's right
to be free from bodily invasion by further treatment was not diminished by
her mental incompetency.' 46 To effectuate that right, the court allowed her
father to refuse the treatment on her behalf.
147
In the wake of Quinlan, courts increasingly found themselves confronted
with the fact that modem medicine has its curative limits, despite its Baco-
nian drive to sustain biological life. Taking a cue from the Quinlan court,
and in' recognition of this medical reality, American courts began to allow
patients the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment when further
treatment could not cure them. For example, in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 148 the court held that it was in the
best interest of a sixty-seven-year-old retarded man afflicted with acute my-
eloblastic monocytic leukemia not to receive chemotherapy treatment when
his disease was "invariably fatal," and the chances for remission, which
would only have lasted for two to thirteen months in any scenario, were
low."'49 While chemotherapy could delay Joseph Saikewicz's death, it could
141. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
142. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
143. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
144. Id. at 662.
145. Id. at 663-64. Accord Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 718
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 159 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Quackenbush,
383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris, N.J., County Ct. 1978).
146. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
147. Id. at 671-72.
148. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
149. Id. at 419-21, 435.
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not cure his underlying condition.
In addition to articulating the four state interests mentioned above,150 the
Sdikewicz decision highlighted the need to maintain the ethical integrity of
the medical profession by seeking out and applying the profession's estab-
lished standards of medical ethical practice:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception, de-
mand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all cir-
cumstances. Rather, as indicated in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical
practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more often in
need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse
necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent
with existing medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten
either the integrity of the medical profession, the proper role of
hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in pro-
tecting the same.1
51
By acknowledging that existing medical mores do not require the continu-
ation of aggressive treatment in all circumstances, the Saikewicz court was
able to reconcile the patient's right to refuse medical treatment with the
state's interest in preserving the medical profession's ethical integrity. This
reconciliation has been indispensable to recognizing patients' rights while
avoiding erosion of the medical profession's ethical standards.
Nearly a decade later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's deci-
sion in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.'52 stands out as a model
for respecting both a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and
the state's interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion. In this case, a healthy, robust fireman, Paul Brophy, was stricken by a
sudden brain aneurysm.' 53 Following surgery, he never regained conscious-
ness. He was in a persistent vegetative state, unable to chew or swallow, and
maintained by a surgically inserted gastronomy tube (G-Tube), through
which he received nutritional fluids and hydration.5 4 Because of irrevers-
ible brain damage that left him unable to respond to his environment, to
communicate, to act voluntarily, or to reason, the likelihood of Brophy's
ever regaining cognitive functioning was substantially less than one per-
cent.1"5 Because Brophy previously had expressed a desire not to be kept
alive in such a condition, and because his wife felt that his "life [was] over,"
150. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
151. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27.
152. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
153. Id. at 628.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 630. This was the testimony of Dr. Ronald Cranford, who had made extensive
studies on the condition of.the persistent vegetative state. Id.
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Brophy's wife and family requested that his physician remove or clamp the
G-Tube. 
156
The attending physician refused to comply with Mrs. Brophy's request
because of his belief that doing so "would wilfully be causing Brophy's
death." 1" The nursing and medical staff at the hospital, as well as the hos-
pital's physician-in-chief, agreed with this position. 158 In setting aside the
trial court's subsequent injunction against removal of the G-Tube, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts effectuated Brophy's constitu-
tional right of privacy and his common law right to uninvaded bodily integ-
rity by holding that Mrs. Brophy could exercise her incompetent husband's
judgment and order the measures she deemed necessary.1 59 Because the
doctors at New England Sinai believed that removal or clamping of the G-
Tube was "contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward their patients,"
the court did not require them to participate in the termination of treat-
ment. 161 Instead, it ordered the hospital to assist in transferring Brophy to a
medical facility at which the physicians would agree to perform the
removal. 161
In so doing, the court firmly announced the policy that a hospital and its
staff "should not be compelled . .. [to act] contrary to [their] moral and
ethical principles, when such principles are recognized and accepted within a
significant segment of the medical profession and the hospital commu-
nity."'62 The court added that neither the doctrine of informed consent nor
any other provision of law would require such a result. 163 Taking particular
note of the hospital's willingness to transfer Brophy to another facility at
which acquiescence in the Brophy's request would not offend the ethical
standards of the physicians, the court concluded that "[a] patient's right to
refuse medical treatment does not warrant such an unnecessary intrusion
upon the hospital's ethical integrity in this case."'"
156. Id. at 628, 631-32.
157. Id. at 632.
158. Id. The court noted, however, that "[a] significant portion of the medical community
disagrees with New England Sinai Hospital and considers it appropriate to withhold hydration
and nutrition from individuals like Brophy when that is the wish of the patient and his fam-
ily." Id.
159. Id. at 633, 639-40.




164. Id. Contra Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) (concluding that if
patient in persistent vegetative state could not be transferred to another hospital that would
respect her wishes to remove her feeding tube, her present hospital would have to accede to her
requests despite the ethical objections of its personnel); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J.
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Brophy established important legal precedent by permitting transfer of the
patient to the care of a physician whose ethical principles did not conflict
with the patient's wishes.' 65 This example was followed in the Baby L case,
which avoided compromising the ethical and professional standards of the
physicians while satisfying the demands of the patient and family.166 In that
case, "[t]he court acknowledged that no physician or institution can be re-
quired to provide an intervention contrary to conscience."'
167
The state's interest in preserving the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession has been universally acknowledged as a firmly established principle
of American bioethical jurisprudence. 168 Over the years, courts consistently
have endeavored to avoid infringing on the consciences and ethical princi-
ples of physicians. For example, in a 1991 Jehovah's Witness case, in which
a thirty-eight-year-old mother refused a blood transfusion for a hemorrhag-
ing stomach ulcer, the court upheld her right to refuse the transfusion, but
strongly underscored its commitment to the ethical integrity of the medical
profession as follows:
1987) (holding that nursing home could not refuse to participate in the withdrawal of the
patient's feeding tube despite its objections and that it could not keep the patient connected to
the tube until the nursing home could arrange for transfer of the patient); In re Requeena, 517
A.2d 886, 890 (N.J. Ch. 1986) (ordering hospital to honor ALS patient's decision not to accept
artificial feeding and enjoining hospital from transferring patient to another facility even
though another facility was willing to admit the patient).
Although Gray, Jobes, and Requeena represent incursions into the ethical province of the
medical profession, these decisions do not supply any precedent for overriding a physician's
refusal to provide treatment that is against her clinical judgment. These cases are readily
distinguishable because in each one, the court was enforcing the patient's negative right to be
free from unwanted medical treatment. In the physician-refusal situation, the patient's nega-
tive rights are not implicated at all. Rather, at issue is the existence of an affirmative right of
the patient to command treatment or a given intervention. This is another question entirely,
and it reaches beyond the developed principles of patient autonomy.
165. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
166. Paris, supra note 11, at 1013.
167. Id. at 1014.
168. See, e.g., Gray, 696 F. Supp. at 588 (stating that a patient's right to refuse life support
must be balanced against the state's interest in the preservation of the integrity of medical
ethics); accord McKenzie v. Doctor's Hosp. of Hollywood, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1504, 1506-07
(S.D. Fla. 1991); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 667, 671 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Donaldson
v. Van DeKamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d
596, 608-09 (Conn. 1989); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); Public
Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163-64
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328
(I1. 1989); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989); Care and Protection of
Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1992); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1269-70
(Mass. 1992); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Mass. 1991).
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The State has an interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession by giving hospitals and their staffs a full oppor-
tunity to assist those in their care. [S]o long as we decline to force
the hospital to participate... there is no violation of the integrity
of the medical profession. We have recognized that medical ethics
do not require that a patient's life be preserved in all circum-
stances. Last, the ethical integrity of the medical profession is not
threatened by allowing competent patients to decide for themselves
whether a particular medical treatment is in their best interests.
169
In a 1992 case, Guardianship of Doe,'70 the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed judgment in favor of terminating the feeding and hydra-
tion of an incompetent patient in a persistent vegetative state. Again, this
court firmly resisted judicial intrusion upon the ethical integrity of the physi-
cians and medical staff involved. Even though the trial judge found no dis-
pute with the position that termination did not undermine the integrity of
the medical profession in this case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that
none of the medical personnel or staff members who disagreed with the with-
drawal of the feeding and hydration tube would be required to care for the
patient. 171
The most important principle to be distilled from these cases is the rule
articulated in Brophy that preserves the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession while providing due respect for patient autonomy. That simple but
prudent and necessary formulation is the following: When physicians and
medical staff hold moral and ethical principles that are recognized and ac-
cepted within a significant segment of the medical profession and the hospi-
tal community, they should not be compelled to act contrary to those
principles. 1
72
As testimony to the prudence of this position is the "Unnecessary Treat-
ment Provision" recently enacted into law in Virginia in the Health Care
Decisions Act of 1992, which embraces the Brophy approach:
Section 54.1-2990. Medically unnecessary treatment not re-
quired.... Nothing in this article shall be construed to require a
physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that
the physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropri-
ate. However, in such a case, if the physician's determination is
contrary to the terms of an advance directive of a qualified patient
or the treatment decisions of a person designated to make the deci-
sion under this article, the physician shall make a reasonable effort
169. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d at 1023.
170. 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992).
171. Id. at 1270 & n.17.
172. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986).
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to transfer the patient to another physician. 113
As one commentator has noted, this legislation represents an attempt to
"accommodate the values of both patients and physicians, and allow room
for differences while not compelling physicians to act in violation of their
own integrity and professional codes of ethics or practice standards."' 74
Furthermore, it acknowledges "that physicians, like patients and surrogate
decision makers, are moral agents .... ,,175
B. The Legal Circumscription of Patient Autonomy: A Negative Right to
Refuse Treatment
Whether they are interpreted individually or collectively, none of the ma-
jor health care cases from Quinlan to Brophy to the one Supreme Court
decision on point, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,
176
supports the right of a patient to demand a specific intervention from a phy-
sician. The Quinlan court held that an irreversibly unconscious patient pos-
sesses a right to decline life-sustaining treatment. 177  This ruling was
founded not upon a positive right, but upon two negative rights: the patient's
right to privacy17 8 and her right to be free from unwanted bodily inva-
sion. 17' This foundation was echoed by the Brophy court, which noted that
"[t]he right of a patient to refuse medical treatment arises both from the
common law and the unwritten and penumbral constitutional right to pri-
vacy."' 80 In Saikewicz, the court spoke of the common law's recognition
that "a person has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual inva-
sion of his bodily integrity."' 8'1 The United States Supreme Court itself rec-
ognized that "[a]fter Quinlan ... most courts have based a right to refuse
treatment either solely on the common law right to informed consent or on
both the common law right and a constitutional privacy right."'' 82 Thus,
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie Supp. 1992). See MARGOT L. WHITE, VIR-
GINIA'S HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT OF 1992 3 (1992) (describing provisions of the legisla-
tion) (on file in the office of The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
174. Id. at 4.
175. Id.
176. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
177. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
178. Id. at 662-64.
179. Id. at 664.
180. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986). See
also Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Mass. 1982) (concluding
that the law recognizes the individual's interest in preserving the inviolability of his person)
(internal quotation omitted).
181. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977).
182. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
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neither Quinlan nor its progeny based the right to refuse treatment upon,
nor do they go so far as to support, a positive right of a patient to direct or
demand a specific medical intervention. Nor is such a positive right sup-
ported by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Cruzan.'8 3 The Cruzan
Court did accept the existence of a constitutionally protected privacy right
of competent patients to refuse unwanted medical treatment;' 84 however, it
did not recognize an established corollary of this right that would entitle a
patient to access to a specific medical intervention from a physician.
No court or medical association has ever recognized such a right. As
Margot L. White of the University of Virginia notes:
[T]he patient's option to refuse treatment has never been presumed
to extend to a right to have any treatment whatsoever. Neither the
professional codes of ethics of the medical profession nor the
courts have ever said that patients can demand antibiotics for
treatment of a virus, or that a physician is legally compelled to
perform a surgical procedure that the patient wants but for which
there is no medical indication.... The patient's or surrogate's legal
rights to consent to or to refuse treatment have always been pre-
sumed to operate within the range of what is appropriate to the
patient's condition.' 85
This distinction is great and must be underscored. Taking the same posi-
tion, Professors Veatch and Spicer write:
Autonomy gives the patient a right to refuse treatment-that is, to
leave the medical relationship. . . . Autonomy is a liberty right.
The patient has a right to cancel the patient/physician relationship
and at least metaphorically walk away.... But that principle can-
not imply that autonomy can give the patient or surrogate a right
of access to care. 1
86
Most recently, Professor Yale Kamisar,187 one of the nation's preeminent
constitutional scholars, has added his voice to the debate.' Pointing out
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' observation that all rights eventually tend to
declare themselves absolute, Professor Kamisar agrees with Holmes' caveat
that all rights are limited by those principles which surround the right. I"9
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2851.
185. WHITE, supra note 173, at 4.
186. Veatch & Spicer, supra note 29, at 23.
187. Professor Kamisar is the Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law
at the University of Michigan.
188. Yale Kamisar, A Law to Stay the Cold Hand of "Dr. Death," WASH. LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 32.
189. Id. at 33.
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On this basis, Kamisar concludes that "the right to die should be confined to
the right to declines or terminate life-sustaining treatment. 190
Under the present state of the law, the concept of patient autonomy does
not embrace an affirmative right of access to medical care. Rather, auton-
omy is limited by the reach of the legal roots that established it: the constitu-
tional right to privacy; the common law doctrine of informed consent; and
the common law right to be free from unwanted or nonconsensual bodily
invasion.191 Each is a negative right, from which no entitlement to medical
care properly can be inferred. There is no precedent in any of these cases to
support a court order directing physicians to provide a given intervention
against their medical and ethical judgments. 192 In fact, the holding in
Brophy was unequivocally conditioned on the avoidance of such a result.
V. ABSOLUTE AUTONOMY: THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE ETHICAL
INTEGRITY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
Extending autonomy to embrace the right to receive requested treatment
would deprive the physician of a capacity to incorporate ethics and values
into the practice of medicine. In everyday practice, the ability to make value
190. Id.
191. See cases cited supra note 73.
192. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C.
1985); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980);
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d
292 (Ill. 1989); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y. S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Summit County, Ohio, C.P. 1980); In re Hamlin, 689
P.2d 1372 (Wash. 1984); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2851-55 (1990) (finding that a patient has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment, but holding it constitutional for state to erect procedural
requirement that "clear and convincing" evidence of incompetent patient's desire to withdraw
treatment be demonstrated); cf. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 591 (D.R.I. 1988) (uphold-
ing patient's right to decline medical treatment as constitutionally protected, and requiring the
hospital to remove her feeding tube and life support if hospital could not transfer her to an-
other hospital that would accede to her wishes); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987)
(holding that nursing home could not refuse to participate in the withdrawal of the patient's
feeding tube); In re Requeena, 517 A.2d 886, 890 (N.J. Ch.) (ordering hospital to respect
patient's decision to forego artificial feeding and preventing hospital from transferring her
without her consent), aff'd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
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judgments is essential to the physician's fulfilling his duty to protect and
benefit his patients. For example, a surgeon cannot be compelled to perform
a risky operation on a patient he knows is a poor candidate for surgery.'
93
Were the physician denied the use of his professional judgment and legally
obliged to accede to patient requests, he would be unable to refuse an angina
patient's demand for bypass surgery even though the doctor might believe
the patient's health would make the patientmore likely to die on the operat-
ing table than to have the angina relieved.' 94 Inherently, such refusal would
involve a value judgment, weighing the value of relieving the angina pain
against the risk of death on the operating table. The ability of the physician
to make this judgment is absolutely essential to the duty of physicians not to
harm to their patients. To deny them this capacity would result in untrained
patients speculating as to the most advisable course of treatment and then
designing the treatment. Such self-treatment would effectively undermine,
rather than further, autonomy by exposing patients to greater risk.' 9
As Tomlinson and Brody write, "Prudent people do not wish to entrust
their health to physicians who are powerless to resist irrational or unreason-
able demands."'g6 "It is for the sake of patient autonomy, then, that physi-
cians must be able to restrict the alternatives made available to patients and
must be able to employ value judgments in doing so."' 97 Therefore, these
authors conclude: "[P]hysicians must be able to employ reasonable, socially
validated value judgments to restrict the alternatives offered to patients, for
the sake of both physician integrity and patient autonomy."'
' 9 8
The proposition is unacceptable that in determining the best treatment for,
a patient---competent as well as incompetent-we should focus not on the
decision itself, but on who is to make the decision. This is not only "nor-
mless,"' 99 but offensive to the physician's obligation to provide care that is
in the best interest of the patient.2" Such an emphasis would erode the
patient-physician relationship and, because of lack of skilled medical gui-
dance, would diminish rather than enhance the patient's ability to obtain the
best treatment possible. An exaggerated emphasis on patient autonomy
must not prevent the physician from carrying out his role. As the
193. Youngner, supra note 122, at 2095.
194. Id.
195. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
196. Tomlinson & Brody, supra note 88, at 1280.
197. Id. at 1279 (emphasis omitted).
198. Id.
199. Telephone Interview with Rev. John J. Paris, S.J., the Michael P. Walsh Professor of
Bioethics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts (November 3, 1991).
200. Pellegrino Interview, supra note 92.
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bioethicist, Rev. John J. Paris, S.J.,2°1 writes:
It is the physician, not the patient, who must sort out the possibili-
ties, weigh the pros and cons, and recommend a course of action.
That responsibility must not be shifted onto the shoulders of the
patient in a misguided attempt to respect autonomy. The patient
or family can of course accept or reject the physician's recommen-
dation. They are not free, however, to design their own treatment;
nor is the physician bound to provide it.2"2
If physicians were legally obliged in the name of autonomy to comply with
patients' treatment designs, the slippery slope toward physician-assisted sui-
cide would steepen to a nearly vertical drop. In light of the actions of Dr.
Jack Kevorkian2 03 and of the popularity of the State of Washington's Propo-
sition 119,2" it is conceivable that patient requests for physician participa-
tion in patient suicide would be numerous. Were physicians unequipped to
resist such overtures and permitted only value-neutral medical judgments,
the death knell of the Hippocratic tradition would sound. Ostensibly, com-
pliance with such requests would contradict the vow in the Hippocratic
Oath that "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor
will I make a suggestion to this effect."2 °5 Such demands--even on legal
grounds-have already been realized by the California Court of Appeal in
Donaldson v. Van DeKamp.2 °6 In this case, a patient suffering from an in-
operable brain tumor sought a physician's assistance in bringing about his
201. Fr. Paris is the Michael P. Walsh Professor of Bioethics at Boston College, Chestnut
Hill, Massachusetts. He served as a member of the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research and participated in the
Commission's authorship of its landmark report Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment, supra note 59. He has written extensively in the area of physician-refusal. See
Paris, supra note 8; Paris, supra note 11.
202. Paris, supra note 11, at 1013.
203. For an assessment of the ethical implications of Dr. Kevorkian's actions in assisting
his patients end their lives with his "suicide machines," see Daniel Callahan, Trying to make
Peace with Human Mortality: Here's One Vote Against Legalized Euthanasia, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 22 1991, at A22. For analysis of the State of Michigan's legal reaction, see Kamisar,
supra note 188, at 32-33 (discussing Michigan legislation, signed into law on December 15,
1992 and effective on March 30, 1993, making assisted suicide a felony punishable by up to
four years in prison and predicting its constitutionality).
204. For a discussion of the Washington measure, see Phillip J. Boyle, Vote Shows That
Euthanasia Debate Will Go On, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at F17; Richard Knox, Washington
State Voters Reject a Proposal to Legalize Euthanasia, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1991, at AIS.
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death so that he could be cryogenically suspended until a cure was discov-
ered for his tumor.2 °7 The patient claimed to have a right to such assistance
from the physician.2 °8 Prudently, the court held that the patient had no
such right. 2 ' Nonetheless, some stridently maintain that "current law gives
patients [a right to die with physician assistance] in some cases, and that this
right is not categorically different from the right to die by refusing or discon-
tinuing treatment., 210 However, proponents of this position also caution
that "the right to die with assistance would provide only a right against state




Simply stated, the preference for a certain medical treatment does not im-
ply a right to receive that treatment. While a patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment is firmly established as a matter of both constitutional and
common law, there is no corollary of that precedent that confers an affirma-
tive right of access to medical care. The President's Commission made this
point unequivocally, and it bears repeating here:
Although competent patients... have the legal and ethical author-
ity to forego some or all care, this does not mean that patients may
insist on particular treatments. The care available from health care
professionals is generally limited to what is consistent with role-
related professional standards and conscientiously held beliefs."
'212
Since, as a general rule, judges do not possess medical training and have
not undertaken the obligations of the Hippocratic tradition, they should not
assume the physician's responsibility for determining which course of treat-
ment is correct for a patient. When presented with a physician-refusal case,
courts should refrain from ordering physicians to begin or continue a course
of treatment or perform a procedure that in the physician's professional
207. Id. at 60-61.
208. Id. at 61.
209. Id. at 62-63.
210. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 2021, 2023 (1992). See also Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response
to a Medical Failure, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1384 (1992) (arguing that the law should
allow compassionate and competent medical practice to serve as a defense against a charge of
assisting a patient's suicide); Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill. Proposed
Clinical Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1380 (1992)
(supporting the legalization of physicians' obliging requests for assisted suicide from compe-
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REV. 2021, 2024 (1992).
212. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 59, at 44.
Beyond Autonomy
judgment is not medically indicated, effective, or beneficial. Instead, as an
initial recourse, courts should employ the transfer approach established in
Brophy2 13 and adopted in the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act.214 If it is
found that the moral and ethical principles upon which the attending physi-
cians base their objections are recognized and accepted within the medical
profession, the court should not order those physicians to provide the medi-
cal treatment requested.215
In order to maintain the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and to
preserve for physicians the moral capacity necessary to fulfill their Hippo-
cratic obligations, priority must be given to the possibility of transferring the
patient to "alternative caregivers who might be likeminded with the [patient
and or his surrogate]." '2 16 This was the path chosen by the Brophy 217 court
and followed in the Baby L2 11 case. Moreover, this approach is supported
by the American Medical Association, 219 and it has been endorsed legisla-
tively in the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act.22 ° In the rare circum-
stance that no physician will agree to provide the type of medical treatment
213. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (1986).
214. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie Supp. 1992). See also WHITE, supra note
173, at 4.
215. See Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639. Indeed, the acceptability of the refusal decision to
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note 11, at 1014.
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sought-that is, there is a consensus that the treatment is either futile or
non-beneficial (and therefore contrary to the physician's obligation to benefit
the patient)-- the patient's request would fall outside the boundaries of soci-
etal judgment about what medical goals are reasonable.22' If a physician
cannot be found who will accept the patient and provide the desired treat-
ment, "then this will [confirm] that the [original] physician's assessment is
widely shared and not idiosyncratic." '222 Under the Virginia Health Care
Decisions Act223 and under the standard set by the President's Commis-
sion, no physician is obligated to provide such medical care.225 Were a
court to order a physician or other health care provider to comply with such
a wish, that judge would be Cardozo's knight-errant, crusading into the
practice of medicine to propose and order the provision of his own vision of
proper medical care while overriding a consensus of objection from the at-
tending physicians and disregarding nearly 2,500 years of the Hippocratic
tradition to the contrary.
Schooled by that tradition and bound to uphold it, physicians have an
"active obligation to [their] patients to ensure that the suffering incurred by
the interventions [they] recommend is outweighed by the benefit of an ex-
pected recovery from the underlying illness."'226 To fulfill this obligation,
courts must allow physicians the moral and ethical capacity to refuse to pro-
vide medical care that would compromise either clinical judgment or medi-
cal ethics. As one noted neonatologist writes: "[I]f physicians are to be held
responsible for their acts, they must have some freedom of choice, some au-
thority over their own actions. For this reason, parents [of young patients]
cannot compel improper medical acts from physicians. Medical interven-
tions must be defensible as good medicine. "227
In the end, courts must realize and accept the limits of medical science
because, "[a]s the Hippocratic tradition teaches, medicine is properly bound
by the potentialities of the object and the powers of the art., 221 Quite sim-
ply, medicine cannot perform miracles. Courts should not force physicians
to attempt them.
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